Good policy doesn't build megawatts

Greece has passed the laws. Some are in motion.

But legislation is a starting gun, not the finish line. Between what’s been approved and what actually delivers, there’s a layer of gaps that rarely make headlines. These are what ultimately decide whether the transition works.

These aren’t the bottlenecks we mapped two weeks ago. They’re not the policy fixes from last week either.

They’re what comes next: second-order problems that only show up once implementation begins.

Markets that don't yet pay for what they need

1. Batteries are legal. The revenue stack is not.

Law 5151/2024 opened the door. But access to a market only matters if that market can generate predictable income.

Batteries earn by stabilising the grid and shifting energy across time. In Greece, the markets that pay for those services are still shallow.

Ireland solved this early. Its DS3 programme guaranteed revenues for grid services, and battery capacity scaled from 75 MW to ~700 MW between 2020 and 2023.

Greece hasn’t built that depth yet. Until it does, batteries remain financeable mainly for large players, and the distributed storage the grid actually needs doesn’t show up.

2. Developers still can’t see the grid

Cost-sharing for connections is now clearer. But visibility of available capacity is still missing.

In the UK, National Grid ESO publishes a live connection queue, so developers can check substation headroom before filing a single permit.

In Germany, the “Marktstammdatenregister” gives real-time visibility of every registered generation and storage asset on the grid.

In Greece, that data isn’t public. Projects clear permits, then stall at connection because the constraint was invisible upfront.

This isn’t policy design. It’s data infrastructure, and one of the cheapest problems to fix.

Demand that isn't keeping pace with supply

3. Industry has direction, but no roadmap

We're building renewable capacity faster than we can use it. Industrial demand isn't catching up.

The fix isn't just technology. It's contracts.

Germany’s "Klimaschutzgesetz" (Federal Climate Act) sets binding annual CO₂ budgets for each sector. Miss a target and the responsible ministry is legally required to publish a corrective plan.

France has committed €5B to decarbonising hard-to-abate sectors (e.g. steel, chemicals, glass) by 2030, which is tied to clear delivery milestones.

Today, we are not aware of any centrally established sector-level electrification plan in Greece, nor any off-take contracts to support it.

One viable outlet for Greece is desalination, which alone could absorb large volumes of midday solar. But without structured demand, that potential stays theoretical.

4. Agri-PV is still sitting on the bench

Solar panels installed above active farmland, high enough for crops to grow underneath. Research shows partial shade can increase yields for certain crops by up to 16%, while the panels generate clean power from the same land.

In a country where ~85% of freshwater goes to agriculture and drought is structural, this is not niche. It’s a dual solution: less water stress, more midday generation.

Germany has a dedicated agri-PV standard (DIN SPEC 91434) and funding stream. Spain is piloting it at scale in its driest southern regions (e.g. Extremadura).

Greece has the conditions, but not the framework that allows it to happen.

The coordination deficit

5. EVs are scaling. V2G is not.

Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) turns parked EVs into distributed storage.

EU rules are progressively pushing bidirectional capability. See last week’s case study on Utrecht's V2G project.

But V2G only works with three mechanisms:

1. Dynamic pricing, so drivers are paid real prices for the power they return

2. Software platforms that bundle thousands of individual car batteries into a single grid service

3. Rules treating vehicles as grid assets (rather than just consumers)

None are in place for the Greek market yet.

Greece’s new €5.3 billion Social Climate Fund plan includes almost €300M for electric mobility. EV adoption will jump. But without dynamic tariffs, V2G rules and aggregation platforms, the extra EVs simply raise peak demand instead of flattening it.

The state is subsidising EV assets into a system that can’t use them as grid resources.

6. Green gas has supply. Demand is missing.

Laws 5215/2025 and 5251/2025 created the production framework for biomethane and hydrogen. Flagged last week as a win.

But supply without demand doesn’t finance.

Denmark paired production incentives with mandatory purchasing obligations on gas distributors, and in turn replaced ~40% of its fossil gas with biogas. Similarly, Switzerland expects to replace up to 50% of its fossil gas with domestic biogas.

Greece hasn’t created that demand signal yet. Today, it’s a pipeline without a buyer.

Execution architecture

7. No one owns delivery

Portugal accelerated by creating a streamlined one-stop-shop and faster permitting architecture. The UK followed with its National Energy System Operator (NESO) in 2024, which is a central coordination unit with authority across ministries.

One entity, accountable for outcomes.

In Greece, responsibility is fragmented. Multiple ministries, overlapping mandates, no single owner of delivery.

The IEA flagged this as a structural risk when reviewing Greek energy policy back in 2023.

When no one owns the gap between target and outcome, the gap compounds quietly.

8. Policy cycles are too slow for the market they're shaping

Between 2010 and 2023, solar costs fell ~90% and battery costs fell ~89%. Batteries are continually getting cheaper (see graphic below). Policy cycles have not kept up.

Germany updates its core renewable energy law (EEG) annually, allowing fast mid-cycle corrections.

Greece reviews its national energy plan every five years. By the time adjustments land, the market has already moved on.

Speed is no longer optional. It’s part of the system.

The real challenge

Two weeks ago: energy bottlenecks.

Last week: policy-based solutions, several now in Greek law.

This week: execution.

Greece has made significant policy moves, but they’re partial, uneven, and often stop at first-order design rather than full market architecture. This is what turns legislation into megawatts.

None of these gaps are theoretical. All of them have been solved elsewhere in Europe.

Nothing here requires invention. Only execution.

Published 21 April 2026, by Evangelia Sigala.

Sources

• EirGrid / SONI – DS3 System Services

• Wind Energy Ireland – Battery storage data

• ENTSO-E – Transparency Platform

• RAAEY – Greek energy regulator data

• NESO (UK) – Connection queue data

• Bundesnetzagentur – Marktstammdatenregister

• IEA – Electricity Grids and Secure Energy Transitions (2023)

• Agora Industry – Industrial decarbonisation analysis (2023)

• IEA – Net Zero Industry Tracker (2023)

• German Federal Government – Klimaschutzgesetz (Federal Climate Act)

• French Government – France 2030 programme

• Fraunhofer ISE – Agri-PV research

• DIN – DIN SPEC 91434 (agri-PV standard, Germany)

• IDAE – Extremadura agri-PV pilots (Spain)

• IEA – Global EV Outlook 2024

• We Drive Solar – Utrecht vehicle-to-grid project

• European Union – AFIR Regulation (EU) 2023/1804

• ACEA – EV registration data

• Greek Government – Social Climate Fund announcements

• European Biogas Association – Biomethane Market Report (2024)

• Danish Energy Agency – Biomethane data

• Paul Scherrer Institute / Swiss Federal Office of Energy – Biomethane study

• IEA – Greece Energy Policy Review (2023)

• DGEG (Portugal) – Permitting reforms

• BloombergNEF – Battery Price Survey (2023)

• IRENA – Renewable Power Generation Costs (2023)

• German Federal Government – EEG revision cycle